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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARKANSAS DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT
Harold H. Simpson II*
and Carolyn B. Armbrust**
Death has become an everyday topic of conversation. The
Karen Ann Quinlan case' recently received prolonged national news
coverage and, while medical and legal scholars argue as to whether
there is a constitutional right to die,2 countless families have dis-
cussed what they would want done under similar circumstances.
Public acceptance of the general concept of withdrawal of artificial
life support to permit a terminally ill patient to die is growing, 3 and
several surveys of physicians confirm the wide acceptance of this
concept in practice.' "Dear Abby" and the Euthanasia Educational
Council' have promoted the "Living Will"' with the result that an
increasing number of people are directing their attorneys to prepare
such a document along with their regular wills.
In response to these developments, several states have at-
tempted to pass legislation7 giving clear legal effect to declarations
* Member of the Little Rock law firm of Spitzberg, Mitchell & Hays; B.A., Vanderbilt
University, 1971; J.D. Vanderbilt University School of Law, 1974.
** Law clerk with Little Rock law firm of Spitzberg, Mitchell & Hays; B.A., University
of Arkansas at Little Rock, 1974; J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law,
1978.
1. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), involved attempts by Miss Quinlan's
family to have life-support systems withdrawn.
2. The New Jersey court analogized the Quinlans' situation to that involved in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the controversial abortion case, and said that the right of privacy
also includes a patient's decision to decline medical care in some instances. In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
3. Comment, The Living Will: Already a Practical Alternative, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 665, 688-
93 (1977).
4. Id. at 690-92. See also Steele & Hill, A Plea For A Legal Right To Die, 29 Okla. L.
Rev. 328, 332 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Steele]; Comment, Involuntary Passive Euthana-
sia of Brain-Stem-Damaged Patients: The Need for Legislation-An Analysis and a Proposal,
14 U. San Diego L. Rev. 1277, 1280 (1977): "In 1974, testimony before a Senate Subcommittee
pointed out that 'about / of American physicians say they practice "passive" euthanasia
regularly-that is they withdraw artificial life support and permit dying.' " (citing "Medical
Ethics: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare,
93 Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974)"). Id. n.20.
5. The Euthanasia Educational Council is a nonprofit organization located at 250 West
57th Street, New York, New York 10019. According to the Council, more than two million
"Living Wills" have been distributed.
6. The "Living Will" is a widely circulated document, the form for which is printed in
Appendix 1 infra.
7. A list of the proposed bills is contained in Kaplan, Euthanasia Legislation: A Survey
and Model Act, 2 Am. J.L. & Med. 41, 55 n.47 (1976), and in Comment, supra note 3, at 667
n.5.
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similar to the "Living Will." The California Legislature passed the
first such act in 1976.1 Other states followed California's example in
rapid succession,9 with Arkansas joining their ranks with Act 879 of
1977.10
Prior to Act 879 a competent adult already had the right to
refuse consent to medical treatment or surgery, subject only to cer-
tain exceptions." Also, under certain circumstances, minors could
refuse treatment for themselves, and certain third persons could
withhold consent to medical treatment for others.'"
However, the exercise of these rights proved difficult in many
practical situations. Frequently, a person was unconscious or other-
wise unable to withhold consent. In certain emergency situations
consent was implied by law,'3 and even if there had been a prior
refusal, the law implied consent if there was a subsequent deteriora-
tion of the person's condition. 4 It was even possible for a person who
was conscious and alert to be caught in a Catch-22 competency
situation:" he had to be competent in order to refuse consent, and
he could not be competent if he refused consent to treatment which
could save his life. Conflicts arose in situations where there was
disagreement between persons authorized to consent for another.16
Physicians were concerned with their civil liability both if they ho-
nored a refusal of consent and if they refused to honor it." Even
8. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7195 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
9. Idaho Code §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-35-1 to
-35-11 (Int. Supp. 1976-1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-320 to-322 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 97.050-090 (1977); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590h (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
10. 1977 Ark. Acts 879 (codified in Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Cum. Supp.
1977)).
11. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-364.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides for consent by a court to
emergency treatment when there has been a refusal of consent for a pregnant female in the
last trimester, minors, and others unable to understand the nature and consequences of such
refusal, and parents of minor children dependent on them for support. See also In r Presi-
dents & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964).
12. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-363(b)-(i) (Repl. 1976).
13. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-364 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
14. Id. § 82-364(b).
15. See J. Heller, Catch-22, at 47 (New Dell ed. 1975), where, in discussing an allegedly
insane military pilot who wanted to avoid having to fly dangerous bombing missions, it is
said, "Catch-22... specified [that i]f he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if
he didn't want to he was sane and had to."
16. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-5 (1972), on which Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-363 (Repl. 1976)
was patterned, contains language not in the Arkansas statute providing that consent by one
person authorized to consent is sufficient notwithstanding the fact that another authorized
person has refused consent or protested against the proposed treatment. See also In re Nem-
ser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
17. See Comment, Informed Consent for the Terminal Patient, 27 Baylor L. Rev. 111,
114-18 (1975).
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criminal liability was a possibility, albeit remote.'" And while they
expressed a person's wishes and desires and perhaps had some moral
effect on family and physicians, the "Living Will" and similar docu-
ments had no certain legal effect. 9
In response to these practical difficulties, Act 879 was enacted.
It permits a person to execute a document expressing his refusal of
consent to certain medical procedures and grants immunity to med-
ical personnel who honor this refusal. A properly executed declara-
tion under Act 879 will speak for a patient who is unconscious or
otherwise incapacitated and can prevent consent from being im-
plied by law. Act 879 permits the decision to withhold treatment to
be made in advance of a medical crisis and therefore provides a
method of avoiding the Catch-22 competency predicament. It also
allows certain persons to execute a declaration for others under
limited circumstances. But most importantly, it provides an addi-
tional, legally sanctioned mechanism whereby -a person can express
his desires concerning his own body.
Scope of Act 879.
Act 879 states that "every person shall have the right to die
with dignity"20 and to refuse the. use of "artificial, extraordinary,
extreme or radical medical or surgical means or procedures calcu-
lated to prolong his life." '2 1 Although the Arkansas General Assem-
bly chose to use the phrase "prolong his life" at five separate points
in the Act, it did not define it. The legislature also left the phrase
"artificial, extraordinary, extreme or radical medical or surgical
means or procedures ' 2 2 without definition.
18. The potential criminality of euthanasia is unclear. There are very few reported cases
in which the issue has been raised. An early case, People v. Kirby, 2 Park Cr. 28 (N.Y. 1823),
involved a father who had drowned his children so that they might go directly to Heaven.
The court refused to recognize that defense. Later cases involving killing or assisting in the
suicide of loved ones suffering from terminal illnesses and pain resulted in acquittals. See The
Law of Euthanasia, 6 N.C. Researcher 159, 161 (1975); Steele, supra note 4, at 337-38;
Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 Baylor L.
Rev. 54 (1975).
19. See Comment, supra note 3, at 669.
20. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3801 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
21. Id.
22. Ordinary medical procedures have been described as "[aill medicines, treatments
and operations which offer reasonable hope for benefit, in which it can be obtained and used
without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience." Conversely, extraordinary means
are those which do involve these factors or which, if used, would not offer reasonable hope or
benefit. Kelly, The Duty to Preserve Life, 12 Theological Studies 550 (1951), cited in 57
B.U.L. Rev. 148, 150 (1977). See also Comment, supra note 4, at 1285:
An often quoted guideline between ordinary and extraordinary care is the statement
19781
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This lack of precise definitions could present problems. For
example, certain nonextraordinary life-prolonging procedures such
as kidney dialysis or the use of a pacemaker could be considered
"artificial," "extreme," or "radical" and therefore subject to a dec-
laration in spite of the fact that the patient, if given the treatment,
would be likely to recover. However, such an interpretation would
be inconsistent with the spirit of Act 879. A more reasonable inter-
pretation of the scope of Act 879 would be one similar to those given
to other states' acts, 3 limiting the use of directives to the situations
in which (1) the patient has been diagnosed as being afflicted with
an incurable and terminal condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness; (2) mechanical or artificial means are being used to sustain,
restore, or supplant a vital function; and (3) death is imminent
whether such procedures are utilized or not, and such procedures
serve only artificially to prolong the actual moment of death.
Incorporation of Probate Code
Act 879 provides that a directive may be executed with the
same formalities as are required for the execution of a will. 4 In
contrast, other jurisdictions detail procedures for execution and also
prescribe the form for the directive. 5
of Pope Pius XII that a doctor is not obligated to provide care "which cannot be
obtained by or used without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or
which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit" (footnotes omitted)
(citing "Papal allocution to a congress of anaesthetists, 24 November 1957. Acta
Apostolicae Sedis 1027-33 (1957)").
Id. nn.52 & 53. However, "artificial," "extreme," and "radical" have acquired no such ac-
cepted definitions, and their use in the disjunctive adds uncertainty to the scope of Act 879
of 1977.
23. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7188 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Idaho Code § 39-4504
(Cum. Supp. 1977); Or. Rev. Stat. § 97.055 (1977); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 45.90h § 3
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978). See also Legislating Death, 49 State Gov't 130, 133 (1976).
24. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3802 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
25. The California act is illustrative:
Any adult person may execute a directive directing the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures in a terminal condition. The directive shall be signed
by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related to the declarant by
blood or marriage and who would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the
declarant upon his decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto then
existing or, at the time of the directive, by operation of law then existing. In
addition, a witness to a directive shall not be the attending physician, an employee
of the attending physician or a health facility in which the declarant is a patient,
or any person who has a claim against any portion of the estate of the deplarant
upon his decease at the time of the execution of the directive. ...
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7188 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). The Act further provides a form
in which "[t]he directive shall be." This form is printed in Appendix 2 infra. New Mexico
also incorporates its Probate Code into its Right to Die Act. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-35-3 (Int.
Supp. 1976-1977).
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Under the Arkansas Probate Code,"6 the declaration may take
one of two forms. It may be entirely in the handwriting of the declar-
ant (holographic) if three credible disinterested witnesses attest to
the genuineness of the handwriting. 7 Alternatively, it may take a
form other than holographic and be executed by the declarant's
signature or mark, acknowledgment of his signature already made,
or having someone sign his name for him. 8 Further, the declarant
must state the nature of the document and have it witnessed by two
persons over eighteen and otherwise competent to be witnesses.29
While other states require that witnesses to a declaration may not
be related by blood or marriage nor be entitled to any share of the
declarant's estate, 0 Arkansas law contains no such restriction.3 '
A directive executed outside Arkansas in accordance with the
law of the place of its execution or the laws of the place of the
declarant's domicile at the time of execution will be given the same
effect in Arkansas as if executed in compliance with Arkansas law.32
This -provision, incorporated in Act 879, places a burden on Arkan-
sas physicians and hospitals receiving such declarations by requir-
ing them to determine whether a declaration was executed in com-
pliance with Arkansas law, and, if not, whether it was executed in
compliance with other states' laws. Other states make no such pro-
vision .3
Presumably, Act 879 incorporates the revocation provisions of
the Arkansas Probate Code and would permit a declaration to be
revoked by a subsequent declaration or by destruction of the decla-
ration itself.34 Other states specifically provide for revocation of dec-
larations, 31 and in some jurisdictions specific provision is made for
26. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-401 to -417 (Repl. 1971).
27. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-404 (Repl. 1971).
28. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-403 (Repl. 1971).
29. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-402, -403 (Repl. 1971).
30. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7188 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
31. While a declaration would not be invalidated because of attestation by an interested
witness, it is arguable that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-402 (Repl. 1971) could cause an interested
witness to forfeit any excess left him in the declarant's will over that which he would have
received had the declarant died intestate, particularly if the will and declaration are con-
tained in the same document.
32. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-405 (Repl. 1971).
33. See statutes cited note 9 supra.
34. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-406 (Repl. 1971). The revocation by subsequent declaration
demonstrates a crucial difference between the probating of a will and the use of a directive
in a hospital setting. While the probate process leaves ample time to produce and analyze
conflicting wills as to which will is in fact the testator's last will and testament, the urgencies
of medical practice may not leave ample time to search for subsequent declarations, and a
physician may rely on one that has been revoked.
35. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7189 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
1978]
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oral revocations." However, Act 879 and the Arkansas Probate Code
are silent on the subject of oral revocation.
Neither the Arkansas Probate Code nor Act 879 permits a
minor to execute a declaration on his own behalf." However, this
fact should not affect the right of a married minor,8 a minor female
in connection with pregnancy or childbirth," an emancipated
minor,40 or an unemancipated minor capable of understanding and
appreciating the consequences of the proposed procedure"' to con-
sent or refuse to consent to medical or surgical treatment other than
by the execution of an Act 879 declaration.
Execution of Declaration by Others
Act 879 is unique in permitting one person to execute a declara-
tion for another." This can only be done for a minor or for a physi-
cally or mentally incapacitated adult.43 Such a declaration may be
executed by either parent of a minor;" by a person's spouse; 5 and,
under certain circumstances, by a person's children," parents,47
nearest living relative, 8 or legally appointed guardian." A declara-
tion executed by another must contain a signed statement by two
physicians that extraordinary means would have to be utilized to
prolong life. 50
An unnecessary element of confusion is injected into the law
because the persons authorized to execute a declaration for another
are not the same persons authorized to consent to medical treat-
ment."' For example, Act 879 provides that a person's spouse may
36. Id. § 7189(a)(3). The Texas provision requires that when the patient revokes the
declaration, the physician shall write "VOID" on each page of it in the patient's medical
records. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590h, § 4(a)(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
37. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-401 (Repl. 1971); 82-3803 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
38. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-363(c) (Repl. 1976). This statute recognizes the right ofcertain
classes of persong to consent to medical or surgical procedures.
39. Id. § 82-363(d).
40. Id. § 82-363(f).
41. Id. § 82-363(g).
42. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3803 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-35-4 (Int.
Supp. 1976-1977), which allows for execution of a document for a terminally ill minor through
court procedures.
43. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3803 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
44. Id. § 82-3803(a).
45. Id. § 82-3803(b).
46. Id. § 82-3803(c), (d).
47. Id. § 82-3803(e).
48. Id. § 82-3803(f).
49. Id. § 82-3803(g).
50. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3803 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
51. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-363 (Repl. 1976).
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execute a declaration for him under the circumstances described in
the previous paragraph." The Act also provides for the execution of
a declaration by a child over eighteen for his parent when the par-
ent's spouse is either unwilling or unable to act.5 3 There is no compa-
rable provision under Arkansas law authorizing a spouse or child54
to consent to medical treatment for another. This discrepancy pres-
ents a situation in which persons who are not authorized to consent
to medical treatment for another person are authorized to refuse
extraordinary measures calculated to prolong his life. Another in-
congruity is that while the father of an illegitimate child is prohib-
ited from consenting to medical treatment for the child solely on the
basis of parenthood,55 Act 879 contains no such limitation.
Possible conflicts between the various persons authorized to
consent for another are expressly dealt with by Act 879. A parent of
a minor56 or a person's spouse 57 has first priority in executing a
declaration for the incapacitated person. If his spouse is unwilling
or unable to execute the declaration, his child of at least age eight-
een5 8 or a majority of his children of that age5" have next priority.
Only if there is no spouse and no child eighteen or older do the
person's parents acquire the right to execute the declaration. 0 Only
if the person has no parent living (and presumably no spouse or
children eighteen or older) can his next living relative execute the
declaration." A legally appointed guardian may execute a declara-
tion for a mental incompetent.2
52. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3803(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
53. Id. § 82-3803(c). The choice of language allowing the child to execute a declaration
when the spouse is "unwilling" to act is unfortunate, as this would apparently allow children
to override the wishes of one parent who refuses to execute a declaration on behalf of the other.
54. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-363 (Repl. 1976). The statute was modeled after Miss. Code
Ann. § 41-41-3 (1972), which permits any married person, whether an adult or a minor, to
consent for his spouse of unsound mind and permits only an adult to consent for his parent
of unsound mind. The Mississippi statute defines "unsound mind" as
a state of mind during which the person affected is unable to understand and
appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or proce-
dures so as to intelligently determine whether or not to consent to the same, regard-
less of whether such state of mind is only temporary or has existed for an extended
period of time or occurs or has occurred only intermittently and whether or not it
is due to natural state, age, shock or anxiety, illness, injury, drugs or sedation,
intoxication or other cause of whatever nature.
The reasons for omitting these provisions from the Arkansas statute are unclear.
55. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-363(b) (Repl. 1976).
56. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3803(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
57. Id. § 82-3803(b).
58. Id. § 82-3803(c).
59. Id. § 82-3803(d).
60. Id. § 82-3803(e).
61. Id. § 82-3803(f).
62. Id. § 82-3803(g).
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Unfortunately, Act 879 does not resolve all possible conflicts.
For example, it is possible for one parent to execute a declaration
refusing treatment and the other to execute a declaration demand-
ing treatment. A similar conflict could arise between a minor's par-
ent and his spouse, between a minor's parents and the minor him-
self, 3 or between a legally appointed guardian and others authorized
to execute the declaration.
Legal Effect of a Declaration
While a casual reading of Act 879 may lead to the conclusion
that it creates some supreme right to die that overrides all consider-
ations to the contrary, this is not the case. Act 879 creates no right
to demand affirmative action to cause death. 4 It does create an
additional mechanism for withholding consent to treatment, and it
does provide for immunity for medical personnel and institutions.
However, a properly executed Act 879 declaration should have only
the same legal effect as an oral refusal of consent under the same
circumstances. In fact, an Act 879 declaration is somewhat more
limited than an oral refusal since it is only effective for such proce-
dures and under such circumstances as it describes, and then only
if the procedures qualify as artificial, extraordinary, extreme, or
radical life-prolonging measures.
A section of the Arkansas Probate Code providing that a will
cannot be revoked merely by a change in the circumstances, condi-
tion, or marital status of the testator"5 is presumably incorporated
by Act 879. A properly executed Act 879 declaration will override
the statute which provides that in an emergency situation in which
there has been a refusal of consent and a subsequent material and
morbid change in the condition of the patient, the law will imply
consent to medical treatment."
An Act 879 declaration which anticipates such a change in the
patient's condition should still prevent consent being implied by
law, since the effect of the implied consent statute" is limited to
situations in which no one is available who may consent, and the
Act 879 declaration should continue to speak for the declarant.
63. Presumably such a conflict would be resolved in favor of the minor child. See
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
64. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3801 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Most statutes have a separate provi-
sion that mercy killing is not condoned. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590h, § 10 (Vernon
Cum. Supp. 1978). See also Steele, supra note 4, at 341.
65. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-407 (Repl. 1971).




While it may be argued that Act 879 is in conflict with and
therefore repeals the provisions of title 82, section 364.1 of the Ar-
kansas Statutes Annotated,68 a close analysis reveals that the two
Acts are not in conflict. Section 364.1, signed into law only days
before Act 879, recognizes the state's interest in consenting to emer-
gency treatment of certain persons: pregnant females in the last
trimester, minors, and others unable to understand the nature and
probable consequences of refusal of such treatment, and parents of
minor children dependent on them for support. It permits a court
to grant injunctive and declaratory relief directing that the neces-
sary treatment be rendered in instances where there is "an immedi-
ate or imminent necessity for medical or surgical treatment or pro-
cedures." Such a situation should be clearly distinguished from
situations contemplated by Act 879 in which artificial, extraordi-
nary, extreme, or radical procedures merely calculated to prolong a
person's life are contemplated.
Affirmative Declaration
Arkansas is the only state presently to provide that a person
may execute a document that requests that all means be utilized to
prolong his life to the extent medically possible." Although Act 879
is by no means clear on this point, apparently this right to request
extraordinary treatment is not on par with the right to refuse treat-
ment. For example, section 1 of the Act states that "[e]very person
shall have the right . . . to refuse and deny [extraordinary treat-
ment]," 70 while it provides that "[a]lternatively, every person
shall have the right to request [extraordinary treatment]"'" (em-
phasis added). Similarly, section 2 provides for the execution of a
declaration "exercising such right and refusing and denying
[extraordinary treatment],"72 while it provides that "any person
may request in writing that all means be utilized to prolong life."7
Further, while Act 879's immunity provisions apply to situations in
which extraordinary treatment is withheld pursuant to a declara-
tion, they do not extend to situations in which liability arises out of
rendering extraordinary treatment pursuant to a declaration.74
68. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-364.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
69. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3801 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3802 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
73. Id.
74. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3804 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
1978]
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The interpretation of an affirmative declaration as merely ex-
pressing the wish or desire of the declarant is also consistent with
prior law and practical considerations. While a person has the right
to refuse consent to treatment and may thereby prevent it, it does
not follow that by consenting to treatment, the person can require
it to be given regardless of whether it is needed. An additional
consideration is the financial effects a binding affirmative declara-
tion would have on the declarant's family. The costs of rendering
all treatment which would serve only to prolong life could be stag-
gering.
Immunity
Act 879 provides immunity for any person, hospital, or medical
institution that "acts or refrains from acting in reliance on and in
compliance with [a declaration] from liability otherwise arising out
of such failure to use or apply artificial, extraordinary, extreme or
radical medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to pro-
long such person's life." '75 Unfortunately, this immunity provision
leaves several grey areas.
Since the immunity provision is limited to the failure to use or
apply procedures, the use of procedures requested in an affirmative
declaration would not be covered. Similarly, the administration of
drugs which effectively relieve pain but accelerate the process of
dying is not covered."
It is questionable whether immunity will be available if the
declaration has not been properly executed. Other states' acts pro-
vide that the physician has the burden of determining that a direc-
tive has been lawfully executed before carrying it out." However,
some jurisdictions provide for a presumption that the physician is
acting in good faith when carrying out the wishes in the directive.9
Act 879 is silent on the matter.
Act 879 makes no distinction as to civil or criminal liability.
Presumably the immunity would extend to both. Other states spe-
cifically include immunity from criminal liability."
Immunity is not available in the situation in which a physician
ignores a declaration refusing treatment and does treat the patient.
The physician will be responsible for unauthorized treatment. 0
75. Id.
76. See Mannes, Euthanasia v. The Right to Life, 27 Baylor L. Rev. 68 (1975).
77. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 97.075(1) (1977).
78. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-35-7 (Int. Supp. 1976-1977).
79. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7190 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
80. See Kutner, The Living Will-Coping with the Historical Event of Death, 27 Baylor
[Vol. 1
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Other states' acts extend immunity to cover such a situation and
provide only that a physician is guilty of unprofessional conduct if
he does not follow a directive." Further, Act 879 should not be
interpreted to extend immunity to a physician who erroneously di-
agnoses the declarant's condition as terminal and withholds treat-
ment. The physician should still be responsible for his own negli-
gence in such a situation.
Conclusion and Practice Pointers
The following procedures, many of which are not required by
the Act itself, are suggested to avoid uncertainties as much as possi-
ble:
1. The declaration should be reexecuted on a regular basis by
the declarant and specifically should be reexecuted, if possible, after
diagnosis of a terminal illness and explanation by a physician of
possible course of treatment and consequences.
2. The declaration should be witnessed by persons other than
family members and other persons interested in the declarant's es-
tate.
3. The location of the declaration should be known to close
family members.
4. An affirmative declaration should not be executed.
5. The declaration should be a separate document and should
not be incorporated into a will.
6. The declaration should specifically delineate situations in
which it will have effect.
7. The declaration should provide that it is not to become
effective so long as the declarant is able to consent or refuse consent
for himself.
8. The declaration should expressly permit the administration
of pain-killing drugs despite the fact that they may hasten death.
9. The declaration should provide that it is the declarant's
intent that any person relying on the declaration in good faith is to
be relieved of any criminal or civil liability which would otherwise
arise from honoring the declaration.
10. The declaration, like any document, should be carefully
drafted .2
L. Rev. 39, 47 (1975); Comment, informed Consent for the Terminal Patient, 27 Baylor L.
Rev. 111 (1975).
81. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590h, § 7(b) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
82. A declaration form patterned after forms prescribed in the acts of other states, the
"Living Will," and the form suggested in Comment, supra note 3, is recommended for use in
Arkansas. Such a form is printed in Appendix 3 infra.
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Act 879 is far from perfect. Many of the ambiguities and uncer-
tainties of the Act have been discussed above, and the Act is un-
doubtedly ripe for substantial amendment. However, given reasona-
ble interpretation and judicious application, the Act can be used in
the interim to meet some of the needs which prompted its passage.
DEATH WITH DIGNITY
APPENDIX 1: "Living Will"
Living Will
To my family, my physician, my lawyer, my clergyman.
To any medical facility in whose care I happen to be.
To any individual who may be responsible for my health, wel-
fare or affairs:
Death is as much a reality as birth, growth, maturity and old
age-it is the one certainty of life. If the time comes when I,
, can no longer take part in decisions for my
own future, let this statement stand as an expression of my wishes
while I am still of sound mind.
If the situation should arise in which there is no reasonable
expectation of my recovery, I request that I be allowed to die and
not be kept alive by artificial means or "heroic measures." I do not
fear death itself as much as the indignities of deterioration, depend-
ence and hopeless pain. I therefore ask that medication be merci-
fully administered to me to alleviate suffering even though this may
hasten the moment of death.
This request is made after careful consideration. I hope you who
care for me will feel morally bound to follow its mandate. I recognize
that this appears to place a heavy responsibility upon you, but it is
with the intention of relieving you of such responsibility and of
placing it upon myself in accordance with my strong convictions





Copies of this request have been given to:
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APPENDIX 2: Directive Form Prescribed in California
Directive to Physicians
Directive made this day of (month,
year).
I , being of sound
mind, willfully, and voluntarily make known my desire that my life
shall not be artifically prolonged under the circumstances set forth
below, do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or
illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and
where the application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only
to artificially prolong the moment of my death and where my physi-
cian determines that my death is imminent whether or not life-
sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such procedures be
withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the
use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this
directive shall be honored by my family and physician(s) as the final
expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment
and accept the consequences from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is
known to my physician, this directive shall have no force or effect
during the course of my pregnancy.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as
having a terminal condition by
M.D., whose address is , and whose
telephone number is I understand that if I have
not filled in the physician's name and address, it shall be presumed
that I did not have a terminal condition when I made out this
directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the
date filled in above.
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emo-
tionally and mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him





APPENDIX 3: Suggested Declaration for Use Pursuant to Act
879 of 1977.
Declaration
Made this - day of I
I, being of sound mind and over the age of 18, voluntarily make
known my desire that my life not be artificially prolonged under the
circumstances set fort below:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease or
illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, one
of whom is my attending physician, and where the application of
life-sustaining procedures would serve only artificially to prolong
the moment of my death and where my physician determines that
my death is imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are
withheld or withdrawn, I request that I be permitted to die natu-
rally. However, I do request care that relieves pain or distress, even
if it may hasten the moment of death.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the
use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this
declaration shall be honored by my family and physicians as the
final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treat-
ment and to accept the consequences of such refusal.
3. It is my intention to relieve all persons from any and all civil
and criminal liability for good faith reliance on this declaration in
carrying out these instructions.
Signed
We witnessed the person named above sign these directions in
our presence. The signer was of sound mind and willingly and volun-
tarily signed. We do not know of any pressure whatsoever being
brought on him to sign.
Witness
Witness
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